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delta measures the diﬀerential payoﬀ that a policy delivers in poor health, while mor-
tality delta measures the diﬀerential payoﬀ that a policy delivers at death. Optimal
portfolio choice simpliﬁes to the problem of choosing a combination of health and
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For each household in the Health and Retirement Study, we calculate the health and
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1. Introduction
Retail ﬁnancial advisors and insurance companies oﬀer a wide variety of health and longevity
products including life insurance, annuities, supplementary health insurance, and long-term
care insurance. Each of these products comes in a potentially confusing variety of maturities
and payout structures. Consider, for example, a simpliﬁed menu of life insurance and annuity
products oﬀered by TIAA-CREF in Table 1. This variety of products begs for a risk measure
that allows households to assess to what extent these products are complements or substitutes
and to choose an optimal portfolio of products. Such risk measures already exist in other
parts of the retail ﬁnancial industry. For example, beta measures the exposure of an equity
product to aggregate market risk, and duration measures the exposure of a ﬁxed-income
product to interest-rate risk. The existence of such risk measures, based on sound economic
theory, has proven to be tremendously valuable in quantifying and managing ﬁnancial risk
for both households and institutions alike.
This paper develops a pair of risk measures for health and longevity products, which we
refer to as health and mortality delta. Health delta measures the diﬀerential payoﬀ that a
policy delivers in poor health, while mortality delta measures the diﬀerential payoﬀ that a
policy delivers at death. Each household has an optimal exposure to health and mortality
delta that depends on preferences (e.g., risk aversion and bequest motive) and characteristics
(e.g., birth cohort, age, health, and wealth). Optimal portfolio choice simpliﬁes to the
problem of choosing a combination of health and longevity products, not necessarily unique,
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that replicates the optimal health and mortality delta.
We apply our theory of optimal portfolio choice to assess the actual choices that house-
holds make in regard to health and longevity products. Figure 1 reports the ownership
rates for term- and whole-life insurance, annuities including private pensions, supplementary
health insurance, and long-term care insurance in the Health and Retirement Study. The
ownership rate for term-life insurance exceeds 60 percent for individuals aged 51 to 58, while
the ownership rate for annuities including private pensions exceeds 50 percent for individuals
aged 67 to 74. In comparison, the ownership rates for supplementary health insurance and
long-term care insurance are much lower. For example, the ownership rate for long-term
care insurance is only slightly above 10 percent for individuals aged 67 to 74. How close
are these observed choices to achieving the optimal private demand for health and longevity
products, given the public provision of insurance through Social Security and Medicare?
To answer this question, we calculate health and mortality delta for each household,
implied by its ownership of health and longevity products. We then calculate the welfare
cost for each household as a function of deviations of the observed health and mortality delta
from the optimal health and mortality delta. For the median household aged 51 to 58, the
lifetime welfare cost is 28 percent of total wealth, which includes the present value of future
income in excess of out-of-pocket health expenses. We interpret this welfare cost as the joint
cost of market incompleteness and suboptimal portfolio choice. Most of the welfare cost is
explained by deviations of the observed mortality delta from the optimal mortality delta,
rather than by deviations of the observed health delta from the optimal health delta. In other
words, choices over life insurance and annuities have a much larger impact on the welfare
cost than do choices over supplementary health insurance and long-term care insurance.
Another way to cast our ﬁndings is that there is signiﬁcant variation, especially in mortal-
ity delta, that remains unexplained by life-cycle eﬀects or observed household characteristics
that capture potential heterogeneity in bequest motives or private information about health.
We highlight a new puzzle that is distinct from the so-called annuity puzzle: the hetero-
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geneity in degrees of annuitization conditional on household characteristics, rather than the
average level of annuitization, is puzzling from the perspective of our model. Our work is not
the ﬁrst attempt to explain household demand for health and longevity products such as life
insurance (Bernheim, 1991; Inkmann and Michaelides, 2011) and annuities (Brown, 2001;
Inkmann, Lopes, and Michaelides, 2011). However, a key methodological contribution is to
collapse household insurance choice into a pair of suﬃcient statistics, health and mortality
delta, which explicitly account for the complementarity of life insurance and annuities as
well as the substitutability of long-term life insurance and supplementary health insurance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a life-cycle
model in which a household faces health and mortality risk and invests in life insurance,
annuities, and supplementary health insurance. In Section 3, we derive the solution to the
life-cycle problem under complete markets as well as a key formula for measuring the welfare
cost of deviations from the optimal insurance of health and mortality risk. In Section 4,
we calibrate the life-cycle model using the Health and Retirement Study. In Section 5,
we estimate the welfare cost of market incompleteness and suboptimal portfolio choice. In
Section 6, we illustrate how a household can replicate the optimal health and mortality
delta through existing health and longevity products. Section 7 concludes. The appendices
contain proofs and details about the data that are omitted in the main text.
2. A Life-Cycle Model with Health and Mortality Risk
In this section, we develop a life-cycle model in which a household faces health and mortality
risk that aﬀects life expectancy, health expenses, and the marginal utility of consumption
or wealth. The household can invest in life insurance, annuities, supplementary health
insurance, and a bond. The household may face borrowing or portfolio constraints, which
may prevent it from achieving the optimal insurance of health and mortality risk.
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2.1 Health and Mortality Risk
In our model, health refers to any information that is veriﬁable through medical underwriting
that involves a health examination and a review of medical history. For tractability, we do
not model residual private information, such as self assessments of health, that might aﬀect
the demand for health and longevity products. In Section 5, however, we examine private
information as a potential explanation for the heterogeneity in the demand for health and
longevity products.
2.1.1 Health Transition Probabilities
The household lives for at most T periods and dies with certainty in period T + 1. In each
period t ∈ [1, T ], the household’s health is in one of three states, indexed as ht ∈ {1, 2, 3}.1
The health states are ordered so that ht = 1 corresponds to death, ht = 2 corresponds to poor
health, and ht = 3 corresponds to good health. The three-state model can be interpreted
as a discrete-time analog of a continuous-time model in which a continuous process drives
health risk and a jump process drives mortality risk (Milevsky and Promislow, 2001).
The household’s health evolves from period t to t + 1 according to a Markov chain with
a 3× 3 transition matrix πt. We denote the (i, j)th element of the transition matrix as
πt(i, j) = Pr(ht+1 = j|ht = i). (1)
Conditional on being in health state i in period t, πt(i, j) is the probability of being in health
state j in period t+1. Death is an absorbing state so that πt(1, 1) = 1. Let ei denote a 3×1
vector whose ith element is one and whose other elements are zero. We deﬁne an n-period
1While three states is appropriate for our empirical application, it is straightforward to extend the theo-
retical framework to more than three states.
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transition probability as
πnt (i, j) = e
′
i
n−1∏
s=0
πt+sej. (2)
Conditional on being in health state i in period t, πnt (i, j) is the probability of being in health
state j in period t+ n.
We deﬁne an n-period mortality rate as
pt(n|i) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
e′iπte1 if n = 1
e′i
∏n−2
s=0 πt+s
[
0 e2 e3
]
πt+n−1e1 if n > 1
. (3)
Conditional on being in health state i in period t, pt(n|i) is the probability of being alive in
period t+n− 1 but dead in period t+n. We also deﬁne an n-period survival probability as
qt(n|i) = 1− πnt (i, 1). (4)
Conditional on being in health state i in period t, qt(n|i) is the probability of being alive in
period t + n.
2.1.2 Out-of-Pocket Health Expenses
Although most households are covered by employer-provided health insurance or Medicare,
they still face the risk of signiﬁcant out-of-pocket health expenses, especially in old age.
Many health plans only cover basic or in-network care, have capped beneﬁts, or do not
cover entire categories of health expenses. For example, Medicare does not cover nursing
home care, and Medicaid only covers a limited and capped amount of nursing home care for
those that qualify. Moreover, a household can lose health insurance through a layoﬀ or a
divorce. Health insurance must specify coverage for each type of future health contingency
and treatment, some of which are not known to exist in advance. The fact that health
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insurance coverage can be short term or incomplete is perhaps a natural consequence of the
complexity of these policies.
We model the consequences of imperfect health insurance as follows. In each period, the
household faces an exogenous out-of-pocket health expense whose distribution depends on
age and health.2 We denote the out-of-pocket health expense in period t as Mt, or as Mt(ht)
to denote its realization for a particular health state. Naturally, worse health states are
associated with higher out-of-pocket health expenses. There is no health expense at death
so that Mt(1) = 0. Since our model is in discrete time, we account for end-of-life health
expenses as incurring in the last period prior to death.
2.2 Health and Longevity Products
In each period t, the household can invest in life insurance, annuities, and supplementary
health insurance of maturities one through T − t. In addition, the household can save in a
one-period bond, which earns a gross interest rate R.
2.2.1 Term-Life Insurance
Let 1{ht+s=j} denote an indicator function that is equal to one if the policyholder is in health
state j in period t + s. Life insurance of term n issued in period t pays out a death beneﬁt
of
DL,t+s(n− s|ht+s) = 1{ht+s=1}, (5)
upon death of the policyholder in any period t + s ∈ [t + 1, t + n]. In each period t, T − t
is the maximum available term since the policyholder dies with certainty in period T + 1.
For our purposes, we treat whole-life insurance as a special case of term-life insurance with
2We assume that health expenses are exogenous to focus on the household’s choice over a rich menu of
health and longevity products. We refer to Yogo (2011) for a life-cycle model in which health expenditure is
endogenous.
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maximum term T − t.
The pricing of life insurance depends on the policyholder’s age and health at issuance of
the policy. Naturally, younger and healthier policyholders with longer life expectancy pay a
lower premium.3 Conditional on being in health state ht in period t, the price of n-period
life insurance per unit of death beneﬁt is
PL,t(n|ht) =
n∑
s=1
pt(s|ht)
RsL
, (6)
where RL ≤ R is the discount rate. The pricing of life insurance is actuarially fair when
RL = R, while RL < R implies that life insurance sells at a premium.
2.2.2 Annuities
Let 1{ht+1 =1} denote an indicator function that is equal to one if the policyholder is alive in
period t + 1. An annuity of term n issued in period t pays out a constant stream of income
DA,t+s(n− s|ht+1) = 1{ht+s =1}, (7)
in each period t+ s ∈ [t+ 1, t+ n] while the policyholder is alive. In each period t, T − t is
the maximum available term since the policyholder dies with certainty in period T + 1.
The pricing of annuities depends on the policyholder’s age and health at issuance of the
policy. Naturally, younger and healthier policyholders with longer life expectancy pay a
higher premium. Conditional on being in health state ht in period t, the price of an n-period
3The insurer could charge a premium that is independent of health in a pooling equilibrium (e.g., group
life insurance). In that case, we would have to solve for a pooling price at which the insurer breaks even,
given the aggregate demand for a given policy. While a conceptually straightforward extension of our
framework, such an exercise would be computationally challenging. We refer to a related literature that
examines the welfare implications of pooled pricing and private information in annuity and health insurance
markets (Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen, 2010; Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf, 2010; Bundorf, Levin, and
Mahoney, 2008).
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annuity per unit of income is
PA,t(n|ht) =
n∑
s=1
qt(s|ht)
RsA
, (8)
where RA ≤ R is the discount rate.
The annuities that we have introduced here are building blocks for so-called deferred
annuities. In period t, suppose the policyholder goes long an annuity of term T − t and short
an annuity of term n < T − t. This long-short portfolio of annuities is eﬀectively an n-period
deferred annuity whose income payments start in period t+ n+ 1.
2.2.3 Supplementary Health Insurance
Supplementary health insurance of term n issued in period t pays out a beneﬁt of
DH,t+s(n− s|ht+s) = 1{ht+s=2}(Mt+s(2)−Mt+s(3)), (9)
in each period t + s ∈ [t + 1, t + n] while the policyholder is alive. Insofar as out-of-pocket
health expenses include nursing home or home health care expenses, we can also interpret this
policy as long-term care insurance. A unit of this policy represents full insurance, equating
out-of-pocket health expenses across all health states in which the policyholder is alive. In
each period t, T − t is the maximum available term since the policyholder dies with certainty
in period T + 1.
The pricing of supplementary health insurance depends on the policyholder’s age and
health at issuance of the policy. Naturally, younger and healthier policyholders with lower
expected health expenses pay a lower premium. Conditional on being in health state ht in
period t, the price of n-period health insurance per unit of beneﬁt is
PH,t(n|ht) =
n∑
s=1
πst (ht, 2)(Mt+s(2)−Mt+s(3))
RsH
, (10)
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where RH ≤ R is the discount rate.
2.3 Health and Mortality Delta for Health and Longevity Prod-
ucts
For each policy i = {L,A,H} of term n, we deﬁne its health delta in period t as
Δi,t(n) =Pi,t+1(n− 1|2) +Di,t+1(n− 1|2)− (Pi,t+1(n− 1|3) +Di,t+1(n− 1|3)). (11)
Health delta measures the diﬀerential payoﬀ that a policy delivers in poor health relative to
good health in period t+ 1. Similarly, we deﬁne its mortality delta in period t as
δi,t(n) = Di,t+1(n− 1|1)− (Pi,t+1(n− 1|3) +Di,t+1(n− 1|3)). (12)
Mortality delta measures the diﬀerential payoﬀ that a policy delivers at death relative to
good health in period t+ 1.
Figure 2 explains the relation between the payoﬀs of a policy and its health and mortality
delta. In this illustration, short-term policies have maturity of two years (i.e., the frequency
of interviews in the Health and Retirement Study), while long-term policies mature at death.
We normalize the death beneﬁt of life insurance and the income payments from annuities to
be $1k. Section 4 contains details about how we calibrate the prices of long-term policies,
which are not important for the purposes of this illustration. The solid line represents the
payoﬀs of a policy in the three health states. Health delta is the payoﬀ of a policy in poor
health relative to good health, which is minus the slope of the dashed line if the horizontal
distance between good and poor health is one. Mortality delta is the payoﬀ of the policy at
death relative to good health, which is minus two times the slope of the dotted line if the
horizontal distance between good health and death is two.
Short-term life insurance pays out $1k only if the policyholder dies. Therefore, short-term
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life insurance has zero health delta and a mortality delta of $1k. Even if the policyholder
remains alive, long-term life insurance is worth the present value of $1k in the event of future
death, which is higher in poor health when he has impaired mortality. Therefore, long-term
life insurance has both positive health delta and positive mortality delta.
The short-term annuity pays out $1k only if the policyholder remains alive. Therefore,
the short-term annuity has zero health delta and a mortality delta of −$1k. In addition
to the income if the policyholder remains alive, the long-term annuity is worth the present
value of $1k in each future period that he remains alive, which is higher in good health when
he has longer life expectancy. Therefore, the long-term annuity has both negative health
delta and negative mortality delta.
Short-term health insurance pays out a beneﬁt only in poor health when the policyholder
has high out-of-pocket health expenses. Therefore, short-term health insurance has positive
health delta and zero mortality delta. In addition to the beneﬁt in poor health, long-term
health insurance is worth the present value of beneﬁts in the event of future poor health,
which is higher in poor health when the policyholder has higher expected health expenses.
Therefore, long-term health insurance has positive health delta and negative mortality delta.
Figure 3 reports the health and mortality delta per dollar investment for these health
and longevity products over the life cycle. In comparison to long-term life insurance, short-
term life insurance generates high mortality delta per dollar investment. Therefore, short-
term life insurance is a relatively inexpensive way to deliver wealth to death, especially
for younger policyholders. Short- and long-term annuities deliver similar mortality delta
per dollar investment, implying that they are close substitutes. In comparison to long-
term health insurance, short-term health insurance generates high health delta per dollar
investment. Therefore, short-term health insurance is a relatively inexpensive way to deliver
wealth to poor health, especially for younger policyholders.
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2.4 Budget Constraint
In each period t that the household is alive, it receives labor or retirement income Yt and
pays out-of-pocket health expenses Mt. The realization of both income and health expenses
can depend on age and health. Let Wt denote the household’s cash-on-hand in period
t, which is its wealth after receiving income and paying health expenses. The household
consumes from cash-on-hand and saves the remaining wealth in life insurance, annuities,
supplementary health insurance, and the bond. Let Bt denote the total face value of bonds,
and let Bi,t(n) ≥ 0 denote the total face value of policy i of term n. The household’s savings
in period t is
Wt − Ct = Bt
R
+
∑
i={L,A,H}
T−t∑
n=1
Pi,t(n|ht)Bi,t(n). (13)
Let
At+1(j) = Bt +
∑
i={L,A,H}
T−t∑
n=1
(Pi,t+1(n− 1|j) +Di,t+1(n− 1|j))Bi,t(n) (14)
denote the household’s wealth, prior to receiving income and paying health expenses, if
health state j is realized in period t + 1. In particular, At+1(1) = Bt +
∑T−t
n=1BL,t(n) is the
wealth that is bequeathed if the household dies in period t + 1. The household must die
with non-negative net worth, that is At+1(1) ≥ 0. The household’s intertemporal budget
constraint is
Wt+1 = At+1 + Yt+1 −Mt+1. (15)
2.5 Loan from Health and Longevity Products
The household can borrow from its holdings of health and longevity products, which we
model as a negative position in the bond. For our purposes, a loan from health and longevity
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products is a simple way to model actual features of these policies. For example, long-term
health insurance and life insurance may have periodic payment of premiums during the
term of the policy, which can be interpreted as a “mortgage” on the policy. In addition, a
household can take out a loan from the cash surrender value of whole-life insurance or a loan
from annuities in a deﬁned contribution plan.
For each policy i of term n, the policyholder can borrow up to αi(n)Pi,t(n|ht) per unit
of beneﬁt, where αi(n) ∈ [0, 1]. The loan accrues interest at the gross interest rate R. The
policyholder can partially repay the loan including accrued interest at any time during the
term of the policy. The policyholder must fully repay the loan at maturity of the policy or
at death, whichever happens sooner. Hence, the household faces the borrowing constraint
Bt
R
≥ −
∑
i={L,A,H}
T−t∑
n=1
αi(n)Pi,t(n|ht)Bi,t(n). (16)
In addition, the household may face additional portfolio constraints, which we leave as
unspeciﬁed in this general description of the life-cycle problem.
2.6 Objective Function
For each health state ht ∈ {2, 3} in period t, we deﬁne the household’s objective function
recursively as
Ut(ht) =
{
ω(ht)
γC1−γt + β
[
πt(ht, 1)ω(1)
γAt+1(1)
1−γ +
3∑
j=2
πt(ht, j)Ut+1(j)
1−γ
]}1/(1−γ)
(17)
with the terminal value
UT (hT ) = ω(hT )
γ/(1−γ)CT . (18)
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The parameter β is the subjective discount factor, and γ is relative risk aversion. The
health state-dependent utility parameter ω(ht) allows the marginal utility of consumption
or wealth to vary across health states. The presence of a bequest motive is parameterized
as ω(1) > 0, in contrast to its absence ω(1) = 0. The parameterization ω(2) < ω(3) means
that consumption and health are complements in the sense that the marginal utility of
consumption is lower in poor health.
3. Solution to the Life-Cycle Problem under Complete
Markets
In this section, we derive the solution to the life-cycle problem under complete markets.
While markets may not be complete in practice, the closed-form solution that this assumption
yields is a useful theoretical benchmark for thinking about the optimal management of health
and mortality risk. We also derive a key formula for measuring the welfare cost of deviations
from the optimal insurance of health and mortality risk.
3.1 Optimal Health and Mortality Delta
When markets are complete, there are potentially many portfolio policies that achieve the
same consumption and wealth allocations. Therefore, it is impractical to characterize the
optimal portfolio policy as a combination of health and longevity products. Instead, we
characterize the solution to the life-cycle problem as an optimal consumption policy and a
set of health state-contingent wealth policies.
To simplify notation, we deﬁne disposable income as income in excess of out-of-pocket
health expenses. We then deﬁne total wealth as cash-on-hand plus the present value of future
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disposable income:
Ŵt = Wt +
T−t∑
s=1
Et[Yt+s −Mt+s|ht]
Rs
. (19)
We deﬁne health delta in period t as the diﬀerence in wealth between poor and good health
in period t + 1:
Δt = At+1(2)−At+1(3). (20)
Similarly, we deﬁne mortality delta in period t as the diﬀerence in wealth between death and
good health in period t+ 1:
δt = At+1(1)−At+1(3). (21)
Proposition 1. When markets are complete, the solution to the life-cycle problem is
C∗t =ct(ht)Ŵt, (22)
Δ∗t =
(βR)1/γC∗t
ω(ht)
(
ω(2)
ct+1(2)
− ω(3)
ct+1(3)
)
−
(
T−t∑
s=1
Et+1[Yt+s −Mt+s|2]
Rs−1
−
T−t∑
s=1
Et+1[Yt+s −Mt+s|3]
Rs−1
)
, (23)
δ∗t =
(βR)1/γC∗t
ω(ht)
(
ω(1)− ω(3)
ct+1(3)
)
+
T−t∑
s=1
Et+1[Yt+s −Mt+s|3]
Rs−1
. (24)
The average propensity to consume in health state ht ∈ {2, 3} is
ct(ht) =
[
1 +
πt(ht, 1)(βR)
1/γω(1)
Rω(ht)
+
3∑
j=2
πt(ht, j)(βR)
1/γω(j)
Rω(ht)ct+1(j)
]−1
(25)
with the terminal value cT (hT ) = 1.
As shown in Appendix A, the optimal policy equates the marginal utility of consumption
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or wealth across all health states in period t+1. The expression for the optimal health delta
Δ∗t shows that there are three forces that drive the household’s desire to insure poor health
relative to good health. First, the household would like to deliver relatively more wealth
to the health state in which the marginal utility of consumption is high, determined by the
relative magnitudes of ω(2) and ω(3). Second, the household would like to deliver relatively
more wealth to the health state in which the average propensity to consume is low, deter-
mined by the relative magnitudes of ct+1(2) and ct+1(3). Naturally, the household consumes
more slowly out of wealth in better health states associated with longer life expectancy. Fi-
nally, the household would like to deliver relatively more wealth to the health state in which
lifetime disposable income is low. Naturally, the household has lower lifetime disposable
income in poor health associated with shorter life expectancy, higher health expenses, and
potentially lower income.
The same three forces also explain the expression for the optimal mortality delta δ∗t . First,
the household would like to deliver relatively more wealth to death if the marginal utility
of the bequest (i.e., ω(1)) is high. Second, the household would like to deliver relatively
more wealth to death if the average propensity to consume in good health (i.e., ct+1(3)) is
high. Finally, the household would like to deliver relatively more wealth to death if lifetime
disposable income is high in good health.
3.2 Replicating the Optimal Health and Mortality Delta through
Health and Longevity Products
Proposition 2. Given an optimal consumption policy, a feasible portfolio policy that satisfies
the budget constraint (13), the borrowing constraint (16), and additional portfolio constraints
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(if any) is optimal if it satisfies the equations
Δ∗t =
∑
i={L,A,H}
T−t∑
n=1
Δi,t(n)Bi,t(n), (26)
δ∗t =
∑
i={L,A,H}
T−t∑
n=1
δi,t(n)Bi,t(n). (27)
Proposition 2 emphasizes the fact that health and mortality delta are suﬃcient for con-
structing an optimal portfolio of health and longevity products. Health delta Δi,t(n) mea-
sures the incremental contribution that policy i of term n has to the household’s exposure
to health delta. Mortality delta δi,t(n) measures the incremental contribution that policy i
of term n has to the household’s exposure to mortality delta. A combination of health and
longevity products, not necessarily unique, that satisﬁes equation (26) delivers the optimal
amount of wealth to poor health in period t + 1. Similarly, a combination of health and
longevity products, not necessarily unique, that satisﬁes equation (27) delivers the optimal
amount of wealth to death in period t + 1.
3.3 Welfare Cost of Deviations from the Optimal Health and Mor-
tality Delta
Suppose the household’s health and mortality delta were to deviate from the optimal health
and mortality delta given in Proposition 1. As shown in Appendix A, we estimate the welfare
cost of such deviations from the optimal health and mortality delta through a second-order
Taylor approximation around the known value function under complete markets. By the
envelope theorem, the welfare cost is second order for suﬃciently small deviations from the
optimal health and mortality delta (Cochrane, 1989).
Proposition 3. Let V ∗t denote the value function associated with the sequence {Δ∗t+s−1(i), δ∗t+s−1(i)}ns=1
of optimal health and mortality delta under complete markets. Let Vt denote the value func-
tion associated with an alternative sequence {Δt+s−1(i), δt+s−1(i)}ns=1 of health and mortality
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delta that satisfies the budget constraint. The welfare cost of deviations from the optimal
health and mortality delta is
Lt(n) =
Vt
V ∗t
− 1
≈1
2
n∑
s=1
3∑
i=2
[
∂2Lt(n)
Δt+s−1(i)2
(Δt+s−1(i)−Δ∗t+s−1(i))2
+
∂2Lt(n)
δt+s−1(i)2
(δt+s−1(i)− δ∗t+s−1(i))2
+2
∂2Lt(n)
∂Δt+s−1(i)∂δt+s−1(i)
(Δt+s−1(i)−Δ∗t+s−1(i))(δt+s−1(i)− δ∗t+s−1(i))
]
, (28)
where the expressions for the second partial derivatives are given in Appendix A.
A household may not achieve the optimal health and mortality delta under complete
markets for two reasons. First, markets may be incomplete due to borrowing or portfolio
constraints, or the menu of health and longevity products may be incomplete for certain
demographic groups. Second, a nearly rational household may hold a suboptimal portfo-
lio of health and longevity products even though markets are complete (Calvet, Campbell,
and Sodini, 2007). This explanation is especially plausible for health and longevity prod-
ucts because there is no clear guidance on optimal portfolio choice, unlike for equity and
ﬁxed-income products. Because these two reasons are not mutually exclusive and diﬃcult
to distinguish based on the available data, we do not attempt to quantify the relative im-
portance of these two hypotheses. Instead, we focus on estimating the joint cost of market
incompleteness and suboptimal portfolio choice in this paper.
4. Calibrating the Life-Cycle Model
4.1 Health and Retirement Study
We use the Health and Retirement Study to calibrate the life-cycle model, which is a repre-
sentative panel of older households in the United States since 1992. This household survey is
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uniquely suited for our study because it contains household-level data on health outcomes,
health expenses, income, and wealth as well as ownership of life insurance, annuities, sup-
plementary health insurance, and long-term care insurance. Some of these critical variables
are missing in other household surveys such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics or
the Survey of Consumer Finances. We focus on households whose male respondent is aged
51 and older at the time of interview. We also require that households have both positive
income and net worth to be included in our sample. Appendix B contains details on the
construction of the relevant variables for our analysis.
Life insurance is written on the life of an individual, while resources like income and
wealth are shared by the members of a household. Because the male respondent is typically
married at the time of ﬁrst interview, we must make some measurement assumptions when
mapping the data to the model. We measure health outcomes and the ownership of life
insurance, annuities, supplementary health insurance, and long-term care insurance for only
the male respondent. We measure health expenses, income, and wealth at the household
level. These measurement assumptions are consistent with our model insofar as the budget
constraint holds for the household, and the male respondent buys life insurance to leave a
bequest for surviving household members when he dies.
We calibrate the life-cycle model so that each period corresponds to two years, matching
the frequency of interviews in the Health and Retirement Study. The model starts at age 51
to correspond to the youngest age at which respondents enter the survey. We assume that
individuals die with certainty at age 111, so that there are a total of 30 periods (60 years)
in the life-cycle model. We set the annualized riskless interest rate to 2 percent, which is
roughly the average real return on the one-year Treasury note.
4.2 Definition of the Health States
In this section, we categorize health into three states including death, which is the minimum
number of states necessary to model both health and mortality risk. For our purposes, the
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relevant criteria for poor health are that both the mortality rate and health expenses are
high. This is precisely the state in which life insurance and supplementary health insurance
are valuable.
In Table 2, we use a probit model to predict future mortality based on observed health
problems. The explanatory variables include dummy variables for doctor-diagnosed health
problems, age, the interaction of the health problems with age, and cohort dummies. The
marginal eﬀect of high blood pressure on the mortality rate is 1.66 with a t-statistic of 3.52.
This means that individuals with high blood pressure are 1.66 percentage points more likely
to die within two years, holding everything else constant. Individuals with cancer are 13.62
percentage points more likely to die, while those with lung disease are 8.21 percentage points
more likely to die. Past age 51, each additional ten years is associated with an increase of
3.26 percentage points in the mortality rate.
Using the estimated probit model, we calculate the predicted mortality rate for each male
respondent at each interview. We also calculate the ratio of out-of-pocket health expenses
to income at each interview. We then deﬁne the following three health states.
1. Death.
2. Poor health: The predicted mortality rate is higher than the median conditional on
cohort and age. In addition, the ratio of out-of-pocket health expenses to income is
higher than the median conditional on cohort, age, and the ownership of supplementary
health insurance and long-term care insurance.
3. Good health: Alive and not in poor health.
To verify that our deﬁnition of the health states are reasonable, Panel A of Table 3
reports speciﬁc health problems that individuals face by age group and health state. Within
each age group, individuals in poor health have higher prevalence of doctor-diagnosed health
problems. For example, among individuals aged 51 to 66, 28 percent of those in poor health
have had heart problems, which is higher than 11 percent of those in good health. Older
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individuals, especially those in poor health, have higher prevalence of diﬃculty with activities
of daily living. For example, among individuals aged 83 or older, 16 percent of those in poor
health have some diﬃculty eating, which is higher than 7 percent of those in good health.
Panel B of Table 3 reports health care utilization by age group and health state. Within
each age group, individuals in poor health are more likely to have used health care in the
two years prior to the interview. For example, among individuals aged 51 to 66, 79 percent
of those in poor health use prescription drugs regularly, which is higher than 52 percent of
those in good health. Among individuals aged 83 or older, 19 percent of those in poor health
have stayed at a nursing home, which is higher than 8 percent of those in good health. These
facts explain why households in poor health have higher out-of-pocket health expenses than
those in good health.
Panel C of Table 3 reports health insurance coverage by age group and health state.
Among individuals aged 51 to 66, 22 percent of those in poor health are covered by Medicare,
which is higher than 17 percent of those in good health. This diﬀerence is explained by the
fact that some individuals who are disabled become eligible for Medicare prior to age 65.
Almost all individuals aged 67 or older are covered by Medicare. Among individuals aged 51
to 66, 58 percent of those in poor health are covered by an employer-provided health plan,
which is lower than 63 percent of those in good health. Within each age group, the ownership
rates of supplementary health insurance and long-term care insurance are remarkably similar
across health states.
Panel D of Table 3 reports the ownership rate of life insurance, the ownership rate of
annuities including private pensions, and net worth by age group and health state. Among
individuals aged 51 to 66, 78 percent of those in poor health own some type of life insurance,
which is comparable to 80 percent of those in good health. Although the ownership rate
for life insurance declines in age, it remains remarkably high for older individuals. Among
individuals aged 67 to 82, 56 percent of those in poor health receive annuity income that is
not from Social Security, which is comparable to 54 percent of those in good health. Among
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individuals aged 67 to 82, the median net worth excluding life insurance and annuities is
$186k for those in poor health, which is comparable to $187k for those in good health.
4.3 Health and Mortality Risk
4.3.1 Health Transition Probabilities
Once we have deﬁned the three health states, we estimate the transition probabilities between
the health states using an ordered probit model. The outcome variable is the health state at
two years from the present interview. The explanatory variables include dummy variables
for present health state and 65 or older, a quadratic polynomial in age, the interaction of the
dummy variables with age, and cohort dummies. The dummy variable for 65 or older allows
for potential changes in household behavior when they become eligible for Social Security
and Medicare. Our estimated transition probabilities, which are cohort-speciﬁc, are the
predicted probabilities from the ordered probit model.
To get a sense for these transition probabilities, Panel A of Table 4 reports the health
distribution by age for a population of individuals born 1936 to 1940, who are in good health
at age 51. By age 67, 30 percent of the population are dead, and 18 percent are in poor
health. By age 83, 62 percent of the population are dead, and 14 percent are in poor health.
Panel B reports the average life expectancy conditional on age and health.4 Individuals in
poor health at age 51 are expected to live for 24 more years, which is shorter than 26 years
for those in good health. The diﬀerence in life expectancy between poor and good health
remains relatively constant for older individuals. Individuals in poor health at age 83 are
expected to live for 8 more years, which is shorter than 10 years for those in good health.
4For comparison, the corresponding estimates of life expectancy from the Social Security cohort life tables
are 28 years at age 51, 21 years at age 59, 16 years at age 67, 11 years at age 75, 7 years at age 83, 4 years
at age 91, and 2 years at age 99.
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4.3.2 Out-of-Pocket Health Expenses
We use a comprehensive measure of out-of-pocket health expenses that includes payments
of health insurance premiums and end-of-life health expenses. As explained in Appendix B,
we use a panel regression model to estimate how out-of-pocket health expenses depend on
cohort, age, health, and income. Panel C of Table 4 reports average annual out-of-pocket
health expenses by age and health for the cohort born 1936 to 1940. For comparison,
Panel D reports average annual income by age, which includes Social Security but excludes
annuities and private pensions.5 Households in poor health at age 51 have annual out-of-
pocket health expenses of $2k, which is higher than $0k for those in good health. Out-of-
pocket health expenses rise rapidly in age, as emphasized by De Nardi, French, and Jones
(2010). Households in poor health at age 83 have annual out-of-pocket health expenses of
$21k, which is higher than $7k for those in good health. Since annual income at age 83 is
$18k, households in poor health must dissave in order to consume and pay health expenses.
Households in poor health not only face higher health expenses today, but they also
face higher future health expenses. Panel E of Table 4 reports the present value of future
disposable income (i.e., income in excess of out-of-pocket health expenses) by age and health.
Households in poor health at age 59 have $232k in lifetime disposable income that they can
consume or bequeath, which is lower than $270k for those in good health. An individual
in good health at age 51 is unlikely to be in poor health or die, at least in the near future.
However, poor health or death can have a signiﬁcant impact on lifetime resources. This leads
to demand for health and longevity products that allow households to insure uncertainty in
lifetime resources across health states.
5For simplicity, our calibration assumes that income depends on cohort and age, but not on health. While
there is some evidence that income varies with health, such variation is much smaller than the variation in
out-of-pocket health expenses, which is our main focus.
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4.4 Pricing of Health and Longevity Products
In our baseline calibration, we set the discount rate on health and longevity products to be
the same as the riskless interest rate of 2 percent (i.e., RL = RA = RH = R). In other words,
we assume that the pricing of health and longevity products is actuarially fair conditional
on age and health. This simplifying assumption is necessitated by the fact that we do not
observe the premiums that households in the data pay for life insurance, supplementary
health insurance, and long-term care insurance. There are various reasons why the pricing
of health and longevity products may not be actuarially fair in practice: rents arising from
imperfect competition, discounts reﬂecting the poor credit quality of insurers, risk premia
arising from aggregate health and mortality risk, and the presence of private information. To
capture these scenarios, we consider an alternative calibration in which health and longevity
products are more expensive than actuarially fair in Section 5.
The impact of private information on the pricing of insurance is ambiguous because
adverse selection on health may be oﬀset by advantageous selection on another dimension
of private information such as risk aversion (de Meza and Webb, 2001). In life insurance
markets, there is no evidence for private information about health (Cawley and Philipson,
1999). Because the pricing of annuities depends on gender and age but not on health, annuity
markets may be in a separating equilibrium along contract dimensions like payout structure
(Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004). In long-term care and Medigap insurance markets, private
information about health appears to be oﬀset by advantageous selection on risk aversion
and cognitive ability (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Fang, Keane, and Silverman, 2008).
Given the ambiguous nature of both the theoretical predictions and the empirical ﬁndings,
the absence of private information serves as a satisfactory starting point for our baseline
calibration. However, we examine private information as a potential explanation for the
heterogeneity in demand for health and longevity products in our empirical work.
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4.5 Ownership of Health and Longevity Products
At each interview, individuals report their ownership of term- and whole-life insurance,
annuities including private pensions, supplementary health insurance, and long-term care
insurance. We do not have information about the maturity of term-life insurance or the
exact coverage of supplementary health insurance or long-term care insurance. Therefore,
we must make some measurement assumptions in order to map these health and longevity
products to counterparts in the life-cycle model.
We assume that term-life insurance matures in two years and that whole-life insurance
matures at death. The assumption that term-life insurance is short term is motivated by
the fact that group policies account for a large share of these policies. We assume that
annuity income starts at age 65, which is the full Social Security retirement age, and termi-
nates at death. We assume that the observed ownership of supplementary health insurance
corresponds to owning half a unit of short-term health insurance in the life-cycle model.
Similarly, the observed ownership of long-term care insurance corresponds to owning half a
unit of short-term health insurance. Therefore, a household that owns both supplementary
health insurance and long-term care insurance is fully insured against out-of-pocket health
expenses for one period. This assumption is based on estimates that nursing home expenses
account for approximately half of out-of-pocket health expenses for older households (Mar-
shall, McGarry, and Skinner, 2011).
Conditional on ownership, individuals report the face value of term- and whole-life insur-
ance. Measurement error in the face value of these policies would contaminate our estimates
of health and mortality delta. As explained in Appendix B, we use a panel regression model
to estimate how the face values of term- and whole-life insurance depend on cohort, age,
health, and income. Instead of using the observed face values, we use the predicted values
with household ﬁxed eﬀects under the assumption that measurement error is transitory. We
apply the same procedure to annuity and pension income.
We model all health and longevity products as policies with real payments. We normal-
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ize the death beneﬁt of life insurance and the income payments from annuities to be $1k in
2005 dollars. Modeling nominal payments for health and longevity products would introduce
inﬂation risk, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, a cost-of-living-adjustment
rider that eﬀectively eliminates inﬂation risk is sometimes available for life insurance, annu-
ities, and long-term care insurance. In the data, we deﬂate the face value of life insurance
as well as pension and annuity income by the consumer price index to 2005 dollars.
5. Welfare Cost of Household Insurance Choice
In this section, we calculate health and mortality delta for each household, implied by its
ownership of health and longevity products. We then examine to what extent observed
household characteristics explain the variation in health and mortality delta. Finally, we
apply Proposition 3 to estimate the welfare cost of market incompleteness and suboptimal
portfolio choice.
5.1 Health and Mortality Delta Implied by Household Insurance
Choice
For each household at each interview, we calculate the health and mortality delta implied
by its ownership of term- and whole-life insurance, annuities including private pensions, sup-
plementary health insurance, and long-term care insurance. A household’s overall exposure
to health delta is determined by positive health delta from whole-life insurance, supplemen-
tary health insurance, and long-term care insurance, which is oﬀset by negative health delta
from deferred annuities. A household’s overall exposure to mortality delta is determined
by positive mortality delta from term- and whole-life insurance, which is oﬀset by negative
mortality delta from deferred annuities.
Figure 4 reports the health and mortality delta for each household-interview observation,
together with the median and mean at each age. Average health delta is slightly negative
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throughout the life cycle. This means that annuities have a predominant eﬀect on the av-
erage household’s exposure to health delta. Average mortality delta is positive for younger
households and negative for older households. This means that life insurance has a pre-
dominant eﬀect on younger households’ exposure to mortality delta, while annuities have
a predominant eﬀect for older households. The variation in mortality delta is signiﬁcantly
higher than that for health delta throughout the life cycle.
5.2 Determinants of Health and Mortality Delta
In Table 5, we examine to what extent observed household characteristics explain the vari-
ation in health and mortality delta. In the baseline speciﬁcation in column (1), we regress
health delta onto dummy variables for poor health and 65 or older, a quadratic polynomial
in age, the interaction of the dummy variables with age, and cohort dummies. These ex-
planatory variables that capture life-cycle eﬀects explain only 7 percent of the variation in
health delta. In other words, the remaining 93 percent of the variation in health delta must
be explained by elements that are outside the life-cycle model.
In column (2), we include additional explanatory variables that capture potential het-
erogeneity in bequest motives, risk aversion, and private information about health. Marital
status and children are insigniﬁcant determinants of health delta, which suggests that het-
erogeneity in bequest motives do not explain the variation in health delta. Health delta for
college graduates is $3.27k higher than that for non-high school graduates, which implies
that education has some role in explaining health delta. Health delta for households in poor
self-reported health is $1.16k higher than that for those in good self-reported health, which
is consistent with the presence of private information about health. However, health delta
for households in excellent self-reported health is $1.90k higher than that for those in good
self-reported health. Overall, the R2 of the regression is only 13 percent, which implies a
signiﬁcant amount of unexplained variation in health delta.
We repeat the same exercise for mortality delta in columns (3) and (4). The baseline
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speciﬁcation in column (3) explains only 12 percent of the variation in mortality delta. In
column (4), mortality delta is $42.60k higher for married households and $33.49k higher
for households with living children. The sign of these coeﬃcients are consistent with the
hypothesis that the bequest motive is stronger for married households and those with living
children. Mortality delta for college graduates is $126.00k higher than that for non-high
school graduates, which implies that education has some role in explaining mortality delta.
Mortality delta for households in poor self-reported health is $39.46k higher than that for
those in good self-reported health. Similarly, mortality delta for households in excellent
self-reported health is $11.77k lower than that for those in good self-reported health. This
evidence is consistent with the presence of private information about health. Overall, the
R2 of the regression is only 16 percent, which implies a signiﬁcant amount of unexplained
variation in mortality delta.6
In summary, we ﬁnd that observed household characteristics that capture potential het-
erogeneity in bequest motives, risk aversion, and private information about health do not
explain much of the variation in health and mortality delta. However, we cannot rule out
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity that is uncorrelated with observed household char-
acteristics (Fang and Kung, 2010). This ﬁnding suggests that preference heterogeneity along
observable dimensions of household characteristics would not be able to explain the welfare
cost of household insurance choice that we document next.
5.3 Per-Period Welfare Cost
In this section, we estimate the welfare cost of deviating from the optimal health and mor-
tality delta in the ﬁrst period, then following the optimal policy for the remaining lifetime.
While the per-period welfare cost is not our primary measure of interest, it allows us to
6We have also ruled out signiﬁcant explanatory power for other variables that capture potential hetero-
geneity in bequest motives (i.e., net worth and self-reported probability of leaving a bequest), risk aversion
(i.e., responses to income gamble questions), and private information about health (i.e., diﬃculty with ac-
tivities of daily living, self-reported probability of living to age 75, and self-reported probability of moving
to a nursing home).
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estimate the preference parameters based on the observed ownership of health and longevity
products alone, without an auxiliary model for how such ownership may evolve over time.
For a given set of preference parameters, we can calculate the per-period welfare cost by
applying Proposition 3 for n = 1. We set the subjective discount factor to β = 0.96 annually,
which is a common choice in the life-cycle literature. We set relative risk aversion to γ = 4,
based on previous estimates in the Health and Retirement Study (Barsky et al., 1997). There
is less guidance in the literature for the health state-dependent utility parameters. Therefore,
we estimate ω(1) and ω(2) to minimize the implied welfare cost, under the normalization
ω(3) = 1. Our procedure leads to a lower-bound estimate of the per-period welfare cost
under the true preference parameters.
Let Lh(ω(1), ω(2)) denote the per-period welfare cost for household-interview observation
h ∈ [1, H ], given the preference parameters ω(1) and ω(2). We estimate the preference
parameters by minimizing the sum of the welfare cost across all observations:
1
H
H∑
h=1
Lh(ω(1), ω(2)). (29)
We use continuous-updating generalized method of moments, based on the moment restric-
tion
E
⎡⎢⎣ ∂Lh(ω(1),ω(2))∂ω(1)
∂Lh(ω(1),ω(2))
∂ω(2)
⎤⎥⎦ = 0. (30)
As reported in Table 6, we obtain an estimate ω(1) = 5.00 with a standard error of
0.13. In other words, households have a bequest motive that is equivalent to 5 periods (10
years) of consumption. This strong bequest motive is consistent with previous estimates
in the literature (Ameriks et al., 2011). We also obtain an estimate of ω(2) = 0.84 with a
standard error of 0.02. The fact that consumption and health are complements is consistent
with previous estimates in the literature (Viscusi and Evans, 1990; Finkelstein, Luttmer, and
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Notowidigdo, 2008).
Panel A of Table 7 reports the median per-period welfare cost by age group. The per-
period (two-year) welfare cost for households aged 51 to 58 is 0.87 percent with a standard
error of 0.09 percent. Using equation (28) for n = 1, we decompose this welfare cost into the
sum of three parts. Deviations of the observed health delta from the optimal health delta
explains 0.02 percent, while deviations of the observed mortality delta from the optimal
mortality delta explains 0.87 percent. The interaction between health and mortality delta
explains −0.02 percent, which is the remainder of the per-period welfare cost. The per-
period welfare cost remains relatively stable in age, although health delta explains a more
important share of the welfare cost for older households.
The top three panels of Figure 5 reports the per-period welfare cost and its decomposi-
tion for each household-interview observation, together with the median at each age. There
is signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the per-period welfare cost across households, implied by their
insurance choice. To better understand the source of this heterogeneity, Figure 6 divides the
population of households into three groups. The ﬁrst group consists of households whose
mortality delta is higher than the optimal mortality delta. These households are essentially
under-annuitized and contribute to the so-called annuity puzzle in the literature. The second
group consists of households whose mortality delta is lower than the optimal mortality delta.
These households are essentially over-annuitized, given the estimated bequest motive, and
should be buying life insurance to oﬀset the excess annuitization imposed by Social Secu-
rity and private pensions (Bernheim, 1991). The third group consists of households whose
mortality delta is so low that their degree of annuitization is excessive even if they had no
bequest motive.
5.4 Lifetime Welfare Cost
The per-period welfare cost is based on the assumption that the household deviates from the
optimal health and mortality delta for the ﬁrst period, then follows the optimal policy for
30
the remainder of its lifetime. In reality, a household that deviates from the optimal policy
for one period will persist in the suboptimal policy for many periods. In this section, we
measure the lifetime welfare cost by applying Proposition 3 for n = T − t.
In order to measure the lifetime cost, we must ﬁrst model how the ownership of health
and longevity products evolves over time, exploiting the panel dimension of the data. In
Table 8, we use a probit model to predict ownership of a given type of policy at two years
from the present interview. The key explanatory variable is whether the individual is a
present policy owner. Individuals aged 51 that are present owners of term-life insurance
are 46 percentage points more likely to own it at the next interview. Similarly, individuals
aged 51 that are present owners of whole-life insurance are 67 percentage points more likely
to own it at the next interview. Individuals aged 51 that are present owners of annuities
including private pensions are 53 percentage points more likely to own them at the next
interview. Individuals aged 51 that are present owners of supplementary health insurance
are 33 percentage points more likely to own it at the next interview. Finally, individuals
aged 51 that are present owners of long-term care insurance are 24 percentage points more
likely to own it at the next interview.
Based on the predicted probabilities from the probit model, we calculate the joint tran-
sition matrix for the health state and the ownership of health and longevity products. For
each individual, we then calculate the most likely sequence of future ownership of health
and longevity products, conditional on the realized health state. Finally, we calculate the se-
quence of future health and mortality delta implied by the ownership of health and longevity
products (i.e., {Δt+s−1(i), δt+s−1(i)}T−ts=2 in Proposition 3).
Panel B of Table 7 reports the median lifetime welfare cost by age group. The lifetime
welfare cost for households aged 51 to 58 is 28.49 percent with a standard error of 0.51
percent. This is a signiﬁcant welfare cost that is equivalent to a 28 percent reduction in
lifetime consumption, as implied by the homogeneity of preferences. Using equation (28) for
n = T − t, we decompose this welfare cost into the sum of three parts. Deviations of the
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observed health delta from the optimal health delta explain 0.77 percent, while deviations
of the observed mortality delta from the optimal mortality delta explain 29.61 percent.
The interaction between health and mortality delta explains −1.89 percent, which is the
remainder of the lifetime welfare cost. The lifetime welfare cost for households aged 83 to
90 is 2.89 percent with a standard error of 0.38 percent. Health delta explains 0.58 percent
of this welfare cost, while mortality delta explains 3.53 percent.
The bottom three panels of Figure 5 reports the lifetime welfare cost and its decompo-
sition for each household-interview observation, together with the median at each age. The
lifetime welfare cost is higher for younger households, for whom the per-period welfare cost
accumulates over a longer expected lifetime. The lifetime welfare cost declines rapidly until
age 83 and becomes small for older households with shorter life expectancy. Mortality delta
explains almost all of the lifetime welfare cost because there is signiﬁcantly more variation
in mortality delta than in health delta.
5.5 Lifetime Welfare Cost under Alternative Assumptions
In Table 9, we examine the robustness of our main conclusions to alternative assumptions
about preferences and the pricing of health and longevity products. On the one hand, a
weaker bequest motive of ω(1) = 4 leads to a per-period welfare cost that is slightly higher
and a lifetime welfare cost that is signiﬁcantly higher than the baseline estimate in Table 7.
On the other hand, a stronger bequest motive of ω(1) = 6 leads to a per-period welfare
cost that is higher for younger households and lower for older households. This points to a
tension that a suﬃciently weak bequest motive that matches the mortality delta for younger
households causes the model to predict a mortality delta for older households that is too low
relative to the data. Put diﬀerently, the bequest motive would have to strengthen over the
life cycle in order for the model to match the life-cycle proﬁle for mortality delta in Figure 4.
Under the stronger bequest motive, the lifetime welfare cost for households aged 51 to 58 is
24.25 percent, which is slightly lower than the baseline estimate.
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Table 9 also examines scenarios in which the pricing of health and longevity products
is more expensive than actuarially fair. We assume that the discount rate (or the expected
return) on life insurance, annuities, and supplementary health insurance is 0 percent when
the riskless interest rate is 2 percent. This is a fairly extreme assumption that corresponds
to the upper range of deviations from actuarially fair pricing that is estimated for the an-
nuity market (Mitchell et al., 1999). Both the per-period and the lifetime welfare costs are
essentially the same as the baseline estimate in Table 7. Our main conclusions are therefore
robust to alternative assumptions about the pricing of health and longevity products.
6. Replicating the Optimal Health and Mortality Delta
In this section, we illustrate how a household can replicate the optimal health and mortality
delta through existing health and longevity products, such as those in Table 1. Our illus-
tration is for a male in good health at age 51, born 1936 to 1940. The household’s initial
wealth is $65k at age 51, which is chosen to match average net worth excluding life insurance
and annuities for this cohort. The household can buy short-term life insurance, a deferred
annuity, short-term health insurance, and a bond. We do not impose any borrowing or
portfolio constraints, so that the household achieves the optimal health and mortality delta
under complete markets. The household’s preference parameters are those given in Table 6.
Panel A of Table 10 reports the optimal health and mortality delta, which we calculate
by applying Proposition 1. The optimal health delta is $7k at age 51, which implies that
the household needs an additional $7k in poor health relative to good health at age 53.
As equation (23) shows, there are three oﬀsetting forces that determine the optimal health
delta. First, the household has preference for consumption in good health over poor health
(i.e., ω(2) < ω(3)), which pushes the optimal health delta to be more negative. Second, the
household saves less in poor health because of shorter life expectancy (i.e., ct+1(2) > ct+1(3)),
which pushes the optimal health delta to be more negative. Third, the household has lower
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lifetime disposable income in poor health, which pushes the optimal health delta to be more
positive. The third force dominates the ﬁrst two so that the optimal health delta is positive
at age 51.
The optimal mortality delta is $188k at age 51, which implies that the household needs
an additional $188k at death relative to good health at age 53. As equation (24) shows, there
are three oﬀsetting forces that determine the optimal mortality delta. First, the household
has preference for bequest over consumption in good health (i.e., ω(1) > ω(3)), which pushes
the optimal mortality delta to be more positive. Second, the household must save for future
consumption in good health (i.e., ct+1(3) < 1), which pushes the optimal mortality delta
to be more negative. Third, the household has higher lifetime disposable income in good
health, which pushes the optimal mortality delta to be more positive. The ﬁrst and third
forces dominate the second so that the optimal mortality delta is positive at age 51.
Panel B of Table 10 reports a portfolio of short-term life insurance, deferred annuities,
and short-term health insurance that replicates the optimal health and mortality delta,
which we calculate by applying Proposition 2. The optimal portfolio at age 51 consists of
188 units (i.e., death beneﬁt of $188k) of short-term life insurance, 1.80 units of short-term
health insurance, and 60 units of the bond. A portfolio of only short-term policies leads
to clean separation between health insurance that replicates the optimal health delta and
life insurance that replicates the optimal mortality delta. Panel C reports the cost of the
optimal portfolio, which is the sum of $5k in short-term life insurance, $2k in short-term
health insurance, and $58k in bonds.
The left panel of Figure 7 shows that the optimal health delta has a U-shaped proﬁle over
the life cycle. The position in short-term health insurance that replicates the optimal health
delta is 1.80 units at age 51, 0.07 units at age 67, and 0.77 units at age 83. Since one unit
of short-term health insurance eliminates all uncertainty in out-of-pocket health expenses
in the next period, these positions imply that the household demands only partial health
insurance for most of the life cycle. The intuition for this result is that higher out-of-pocket
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health expenses in poor health are oﬀset by shorter life expectancy, lowering the optimal
health delta relative to full health insurance.
The right panel of Figure 7 shows that the optimal mortality delta declines over the
life cycle. To replicate the optimal mortality delta, the household must hold short-term life
insurance when young to generate positive mortality delta, then switch to deferred annuities
when old to generate negative mortality delta. The optimal position in deferred annuities
increases from 17 units (i.e., annuity income of $17k over two years) at age 59 to 125 units
at age 83. The life-cycle proﬁle for optimal mortality delta suggest that insurance com-
panies may want to package life insurance and annuities into a “life-cycle product” that
automatically switches from life insurance to annuities around retirement age.
In this illustration, the household is exposed to reclassiﬁcation risk because it can only
invest in short-term life insurance and health insurance. In other words, a household in good
health at age 51 has to pay a higher premium for life insurance and health insurance at age
53 if its health deteriorates. As emphasized by Cochrane (1995), the household can insure
reclassiﬁcation risk in a world with health state-contingent securities. Our illustration here
shows that an optimal portfolio of short-term life insurance and health insurance essentially
replicates health state-contingent securities, thereby insuring reclassiﬁcation risk.
7. Conclusion
We have developed health and mortality delta as useful risk measures for thinking about
health and longevity products such as life insurance, annuities, and supplementary health
insurance. We believe that retail ﬁnancial advisors and insurance companies should report
the health and mortality delta of their health and longevity products, just as mutual fund
companies report the market beta of their equity products and the duration of their ﬁxed-
income products. Financial advisors and insurance brokers should guide households on the
optimal exposure to health and mortality delta over the life cycle, based on their preferences
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(e.g., risk aversion and bequest motive) and characteristics (e.g., birth cohort, age, health,
and wealth). We hope that the introduction of these risk measures will facilitate standard-
ization, identify overlap between existing products, identify risks that are not insured by
existing products, and ultimately lead to new product development.
There are two potential interpretations for our estimate of the welfare cost of household
insurance choice. Our preferred interpretation is that there are signiﬁcant welfare gains that
can be achieved by completing missing insurance markets and by eliminating suboptimal
portfolio choice. The existence of suboptimal portfolio choice is plausible for health and
longevity products because there is no clear guidance on optimal portfolio choice, unlike for
equity and ﬁxed-income products. An alternative interpretation is the existence of unob-
served preference heterogeneity. We are skeptical of this possibility because our empirical
ﬁndings suggest that such preference heterogeneity must be entirely unrelated to observable
proxies for bequest motives, risk aversion, and private information about health.
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Appendix A. Proof of the Propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We rewrite savings in period t as
Wt − Ct =
3∑
j=1
πt(ht, j)
R
At+1(j). (A1)
The household maximizes the objective function (17) subject to equation (A1) and the
intertemporal budget constraint (15). In each period t ∈ [1, T − 1], the Bellman equation is
Vt(ht,Wt) = max
Ct,At+1(1),At+1(2),At+1(3)
{
ω(ht)
γC1−γt
+β
[
πt(ht, 1)ω(1)
γAt+1(1)
1−γ +
3∑
j=2
πt(ht, j)Vt+1(j,Wt+1(j))
1−γ
]}1/1−γ
. (A2)
The proposition claims that the optimal health state-contingent wealth policies are given by
A∗t+1(1) =
(βR)1/γω(1)C∗t
ω(ht)
, (A3)
A∗t+1(j) =
(βR)1/γω(j)C∗t
ω(ht)ct+1(j)
−
T−t∑
s=1
Et+1[Yt+s −Mt+s|j]
Rs−1
∀j ∈ {2, 3}. (A4)
The proof proceeds by backward induction.
Because the household dies with certainty in period T+1, optimal consumption in period
T is C∗T = WT . Thus, the value function in period T is
VT (hT ,WT ) = ω(hT )
γ/(1−γ)WT . (A5)
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The ﬁrst-order conditions in period T − 1 are
ω(hT−1)γC
∗−γ
T−1 =βRω(1)
γA∗T (1)
−γ
=βRω(hT )
γ(A∗T (j) + YT (j)−MT (j))−γ ∀j ∈ {2, 3}. (A6)
These equations, together with equation (A1), imply the policy functions (22), (A3), and
(A4) for period T −1. Substituting the policy functions into the Bellman equation, the value
function in period T − 1 is
VT−1(hT−1,WT−1) =
(
ω(hT−1)
cT−1(hT−1)
)γ/(1−γ)
ŴT−1. (A7)
Suppose that the value function in each period t + 1 is
Vt+1(ht+1,Wt+1) =
(
ω(ht+1)
ct+1(ht+1)
)γ/(1−γ)
Ŵt+1. (A8)
The ﬁrst-order conditions in each period t are
ω(ht)
γC∗−γt =βRω(1)
γA∗t+1(1)
−γ
=
βRω(j)γ
ct+1(j)γ
(
A∗t+1(j) +
T−t∑
s=1
Et+1[Yt+s −Mt+s|j]
Rs−1
)−γ
∀j ∈ {2, 3}. (A9)
These equations, together with equation (A1), imply the policy functions (22), (A3), and
(A4) for each period t. Substituting the policy functions into the Bellman equation, the
value function in each period t is
Vt(ht,Wt) =
(
ω(ht)
ct(ht)
)γ/(1−γ)
Ŵt. (A10)
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
To simplify notation, let π0t (ht, i) = 1{ht=i}. Iterating forward on the budget constraint (A1),
Wt − Ct =
n−1∑
s=1
3∑
i=2
πst (ht, i)
Rs
(Ct+s(i)− Yt+s(i) +Mt+s(i))
+
n∑
s=1
3∑
i=2
πs−1t (ht, i)πt+s−1(i, 1)
Rs
(δt+s−1(i) + At+s(i))
+
3∑
i=2
[
πn−1t (ht, i)πt+n−1(i, 2)
Rn
(Δt+n−1(i) + At+n(i))
+
πn−1t (ht, i)πt+n−1(i, 3)
Rn
At+n(i)
]
. (A11)
We consider perturbations of health and mortality delta that satisfy the budget constraint:
∂Δt+n−1(i) + πt+n−1(i, 2)∂At+n(i) = 0, (A12)
∂δt+n−1(i) + πt+n−1(i, 1)∂At+n(i) = 0. (A13)
We write the value function under complete markets as
Vt(Δt+n−1(i), δt+n−1(i)) =
{
ω(ht)
γC1−γt +
n−1∑
s=1
βs
3∑
i=2
πst (ht, i)ω(i)
γCt+s(i)
1−γ
+
n∑
s=1
βs
3∑
i=2
πs−1t (ht, i)πt+s−1(i, 1)ω(1)
γ(δt+s−1(i) + At+s(i))1−γ
+ βn
3∑
i=2
[
πn−1t (ht, i)πt+n−1(i, 2)Vt+n(2,Δt+n−1(i) + At+n(i) + Yt+n(2)−Mt+n(2))1−γ
+πn−1t (ht, i)πt+n−1(i, 3)Vt+n(3, At+n(i) + Yt+n(3)−Mt+n(3))1−γ
]}1/(1−γ)
. (A14)
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Iterating forward on the ﬁrst-order conditions (A9),
(
ω(ht)
ct(ht)
)γ/(1−γ)
V ∗−γt = (βR)
nω(1)γ(δ∗t+n−1(i) + A
∗
t+n(i))
−γ
= (βR)n
(
ω(2)
ct+n(2)
)γ/(1−γ)
Vt+n(2,Δ
∗
t+n−1(i) + A
∗
t+n(i) + Yt+n(2)−Mt+n(2))−γ
= (βR)n
(
ω(3)
ct+n(3)
)γ/(1−γ)
Vt+n(3, A
∗
t+n(i) + Yt+n(3)−Mt+n(3))−γ. (A15)
Taking the partial derivative of equation (A14) with respect to Δt+n−1(i),
∂Vt(Δt+n−1(i), δt+n−1(i))
∂Δt+n−1(i)
= βnπn−1t (ht, i)πt+n−1(i, 2)V
γ
t
× [−πt+n−1(i, 1)ω(1)γ(δt+n−1(i) + At+n(i))−γ
+ (1− πt+n−1(i, 2))
(
ω(2)
ct+n(2)
)γ/(1−γ)
Vt+n(2,Δt+n−1(i) + At+n(i) + Yt+n(2)−Mt+n(2))−γ
−πt+n−1(i, 3)
(
ω(3)
ct+n(3)
)γ/(1−γ)
Vt+n(3, At+n(i) + Yt+n(3)−Mt+n(3))−γ
]
. (A16)
Evaluating at the optimal policy,
∂Vt(Δ
∗
t+n−1(i), δ
∗
t+n−1(i))
∂Δt+n−1(i)
= 0. (A17)
Similarly, the ﬁrst partial derivative of the value function with respect to mortality delta,
evaluated at the optimal policy, is
∂Vt(Δ
∗
t+n−1(i), δ
∗
t+n−1(i))
∂δt+n−1(i)
= 0. (A18)
Taking the partial derivative of equation (A16) with respect to Δt+n−1(i) and evaluating
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at the optimal policy,
∂2Vt(Δ
∗
t+n−1(i), δ
∗
t+n−1(i))
∂Δt+n−1(i)2
= −γβnπn−1t (ht, i)πt+n−1(i, 2)2V ∗γt
× [πt+n−1(i, 1)ω(1)γ(δ∗t+n−1(i) + A∗t+n(i))−1−γ
+
(1− πt+n−1(i, 2))2
πt+n−1(i, 2)
(
ω(2)
ct+n(2)
)2γ/(1−γ)
Vt+n(2,Δ
∗
t+n−1(i) + A
∗
t+n(i) + Yt+n(2)−Mt+n(2))−1−γ
+πt+n−1(i, 3)
(
ω(3)
ct+n(3)
)2γ/(1−γ)
Vt+n(3, A
∗
t+n(i) + Yt+n(3)−Mt+n(3))−1−γ
]
. (A19)
Substituting the ﬁrst-order conditions (A15),
∂2Vt(Δ
∗
t+n−1(i), δ
∗
t+n−1(i))
∂Δt+n−1(i)2
= −γπ
n−1
t (ht, i)πt+n−1(i, 2)
2
βn/γRn(1+1/γ)V ∗t
(
ω(ht)
ct(ht)
)(1+γ)/(1−γ)
×
[
πt+n−1(i, 1)
ω(1)
+
(1− πt+n−1(i, 2))2ct+n(2)
πt+n−1(i, 2)ω(2)
+
πt+n−1(i, 3)ct+n(3)
ω(3)
]
. (A20)
Similarly, the second partial derivative of the value function with respect to mortality delta,
evaluated at the optimal policy, is
∂2Vt(Δ
∗
t+n−1(i), δ
∗
t+n−1(i))
∂δt+n−1(i)2
= −γπ
n−1
t (ht, i)πt+n−1(i, 1)
2
βn/γRn(1+1/γ)V ∗t
(
ω(ht)
ct(ht)
)(1+γ)/(1−γ)
×
[
(1− πt+n−1(i, 1))2
πt+n−1(i, 1)ω(1)
+
πt+n−1(i, 2)ct+n(2)
ω(2)
+
πt+n−1(i, 3)ct+n(3)
ω(3)
]
. (A21)
Finally, the cross-partial derivative of the value function with respect to health and mortality
delta, evaluated at the optimal policy, is
∂2Vt(Δ
∗
t+n−1(i), δ
∗
t+n−1(i))
∂Δt+n−1(i)∂δt+n−1(i)
= −γπ
n−1
t (ht, i)πt+n−1(i, 1)πt+n−1(i, 2)
βn/γRn(1+1/γ)V ∗t
(
ω(ht)
ct(ht)
)(1+γ)/(1−γ)
×
[
−1− πt+n−1(i, 1)
ω(1)
− (1− πt+n−1(i, 2))ct+n(2)
ω(2)
+
πt+n−1(i, 3)ct+n(3)
ω(3)
]
. (A22)
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Dividing by V ∗t and substituting the value function (A10),
∂2Lt(Δ
∗
t+n−1(i), δ
∗
t+n−1(i))
∂Δt+n−1(i)2
= −γπ
n−1
t (ht, i)πt+n−1(i, 2)
2ω(ht)
βn/γRn(1+1/γ)ct(ht)Ŵ
2
t
×
[
πt+n−1(i, 1)
ω(1)
+
(1− πt+n−1(i, 2))2ct+n(2)
πt+n−1(i, 2)ω(2)
+
πt+n−1(i, 3)ct+n(3)
ω(3)
]
. (A23)
∂2Lt(Δ
∗
t+n−1(i), δ
∗
t+n−1(i))
∂δt+n−1(i)2
= −γπ
n−1
t (ht, i)πt+n−1(i, 1)
2ω(ht)
βn/γRn(1+1/γ)ct(ht)Ŵ 2t
×
[
(1− πt+n−1(i, 1))2
πt+n−1(i, 1)ω(1)
+
πt+n−1(i, 2)ct+n(2)
ω(2)
+
πt+n−1(i, 3)ct+n(3)
ω(3)
]
. (A24)
∂2Lt(Δ
∗
t+n−1(i), δ
∗
t+n−1(i))
∂Δt+n−1(i)∂δt+n−1(i)
= −γπ
n−1
t (ht, i)πt+n−1(i, 1)πt+n−1(i, 2)ω(ht)
βn/γRn(1+1/γ)ct(ht)Ŵ 2t
×
[
−1− πt+n−1(i, 1)
ω(1)
− (1− πt+n−1(i, 2))ct+n(2)
ω(2)
+
πt+n−1(i, 3)ct+n(3)
ω(3)
]
. (A25)
Appendix B. Health and Retirement Study
The Health and Retirement Study is a panel survey designed to study the health and wealth
dynamics of the elderly in the United States. The data consist of ﬁve cohorts: the Study
of Assets and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (born before 1924), the Children of
Depression (born 1924 to 1930), the initial HRS cohort (born 1931 to 1941), the War Baby
(born 1942 to 1947), and the Early Baby Boomer (born 1948 to 1953). Many of the variables
that we use are from the RAND HRS (Version I), which is produced by the RAND Center
for the Study of Aging with funding from the National Institute on Aging and the Social
Security Administration. Whenever necessary, we use variables from both the core and exit
interviews to supplement the RAND HRS. The data consist of eight waves, covering every
two years between 1992 and 2006.
The Health and Retirement Study continues to interview respondents that enter nursing
homes. However, any respondent that enters a nursing home receives a zero sampling weight
because these weights are based on the non-institutionalized population of the Current Popu-
lation Survey. Therefore, the use of sampling weights would lead us to underestimate nursing
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home expenses, which account for a signiﬁcant share of out-of-pocket health expenses for
older households. Because nursing home expenses are important for this paper, we do not
use sampling weights in any of our analysis.
Since wave 3, the survey asks bracketing questions to solicit a range of values for ques-
tions that initially receive a non-response. Based on the range of values implied by the
bracketing questions, we use the following methodology to impute missing observations. For
each missing observation, we calculate the minimum and maximum values that are implied
by the responses to the bracketing questions. For each non-missing observation, we set the
minimum and maximum values to be the valid response. We then estimate the mean and
the standard deviation of the variable in question through interval regression, under the
assumption of log-normality. Finally, we ﬁll in each missing observation as the conditional
mean of the distribution in the bracketed range.
B.1 Out-of-Pocket Health Expenses
Out-of-pocket health expenses from the RAND HRS are the total amount paid for hos-
pitals, nursing homes, doctor visits, dentist visits, outpatient surgery, prescription drugs,
home health care, and special facilities. Payments of health insurance premiums from the
core interviews are the sum of premiums paid for Medicare/Medicaid HMO, private health
insurance, long-term care insurance, and prescription drug coverage (i.e., Medicare Part D).
We convert the premium reported at monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, or annual frequency
to the total implied payment over the previous two years.
Since wave 3, out-of-pocket health expenses at the end of life are available through the
exit interviews. Without end-of-life expenses, we would underestimate the true cost of poor
health in old age, especially in the upper tail of the distribution (Marshall, McGarry, and
Skinner, 2011). Out-of-pocket health expenses from the exit interviews are the total amount
paid for hospitals, nursing homes, doctor visits, prescription drugs, home health care, other
health services, other medical expenses, and other non-medical expenses.
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We measure out-of-pocket health expenses as the sum of out-of-pocket health expenses
from the RAND HRS and payments of health insurance premiums from the core interviews.
For the last core interview prior to death of the primary respondent, we also add out-of-pocket
health expenses at the end of life from the exit interviews. We measure out-of-pocket health
expenses at the household level as the sum of these expenses for both the male respondent
and his wife, if married.
We estimate the life-cycle proﬁle for out-of-pocket health expenses through a panel re-
gression with household ﬁxed eﬀects. We model the logarithm of real out-of-pocket health
expenses as a function of dummy variables for health and 65 or older, a quadratic polynomial
in age, income, and the interaction of the dummy variables with age and income. The dummy
variable for 65 or older allows for potential changes in household behavior when they become
eligible for Social Security and Medicare. We use the estimated regression model, averaging
the household ﬁxed eﬀects by cohort and ownership of supplementary health insurance and
long-term care insurance, to predict out-of-pocket health expenses in the absence of these
policies by cohort, age, and health.
B.2 Income
Income includes labor income, Social Security disability and supplemental security income,
Social Security retirement income, and unemployment or workers compensation. Income
excludes pension and annuity income and capital income. We calculate after-tax income
by subtracting federal income tax liabilities, estimated through the NBER TAXSIM pro-
gram (Version 9). We measure household income as the sum of income for both the male
respondent and his wife, if married.
We estimate the life-cycle proﬁle for income through a panel regression with household
ﬁxed eﬀects. We model the logarithm of real after-tax income as a function of a dummy
variable for 65 or older, a quadratic polynomial in age, and the interaction of the dummy
variable with age. We use the estimated regression model, averaging the household ﬁxed
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eﬀects by cohort, to predict income by cohort and age.
B.3 Life Insurance
We measure the ownership and the face value of life insurance using the core interviews.
Term-life insurance refers to individual and group policies that have only a death beneﬁt.
Whole-life insurance refers to policies that build cash value, from which the policyholder can
borrow or receive cash upon surrender of the policy. In waves 1 through 3, we measure the
total face value of all policies as the sum of the face value of term- and whole-life insurance.
In wave 4, only the total face value of all policies, and not the breakdown between term-
and whole-life insurance, is available. In waves 5 through 8, we measure the total face value
of term-life insurance as the diﬀerence between the face value of all policies and whole-life
insurance.
We estimate the life-cycle proﬁle for the face value of life insurance through a panel
regression with household ﬁxed eﬀects. We model the logarithm of the real face value of life
insurance as a function of dummy variables for health and 65 or older, a quadratic polynomial
in age, income, and the interaction of the dummy variables with age and income. We use
the estimated regression model, averaging the household ﬁxed eﬀects by cohort, to predict
the face value of life insurance by cohort, age, and health.
B.4 Annuities including Private Pensions
We deﬁne ownership of annuities including private pensions as either participation in a
deﬁned-beneﬁt plan at the present employer or positive reported pension and annuity income.
We estimate the life-cycle proﬁle for pension and annuity income through a panel regression
with household ﬁxed eﬀects. We model the logarithm of real pension and annuity income
as a function of dummy variables for health and 65 or older, a quadratic polynomial in
age, income, and the interaction of the dummy variables with age and income. We use
the estimated regression model, averaging the household ﬁxed eﬀects by cohort, to predict
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pension and annuity income by cohort, age, and health.
B.5 Net Worth
Household assets include checking, savings, and money market accounts; CD, government
savings bonds, and T-bills; bonds and bond funds; IRA and Keogh accounts; businesses;
stocks, mutual funds, and investment trusts; and primary and secondary residence. House-
hold liabilities include all mortgages for primary and secondary residence, other home loans
for primary residence, and other debt. Net worth is the value of assets minus the value of
liabilities.
We estimate the life-cycle proﬁle for net worth through a panel regression with household
ﬁxed eﬀects. We model the logarithm of real net worth as a function of dummy variables
for health and 65 or older, a quadratic polynomial in age, income, and the interaction of the
dummy variables with age and income. We use the estimated regression model, averaging
the household ﬁxed eﬀects by cohort, to predict net worth by cohort, age, and health.
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Table 1: Life Insurance and Annuity Products Oﬀered by TIAA-CREF
This table lists the life insurance and annuity products oﬀered by TIAA-CREF, a ﬁnancial
services company based in New York, as of December 2010.
Name of product Term Income deferrable
Panel A: Life insurance products
Annual Renewable Term 1 year
Level Term 10, 15, 20, or 30 years
Intelligent Life Universal Life
Panel B: Annuity products
Single Premium Immediate Life
Investment Horizon Life 14 months–90th birthday
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Table 2: Predicting Future Mortality with Observed Health Problems
This table reports an estimate of a probit model for predicting death within two years
from the present interview. The explanatory variables include dummy variables for doctor-
diagnosed health problems, age, the interaction of the health problems with age, and cohort
dummies. The omitted cohort is those born prior to 1911. The table reports the marginal
eﬀects on the mortality rate (in percentage points) with heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics
in parentheses. The sample consists of male respondents aged 51 and older in the Health
and Retirement Study for the period 1992 to 2006.
Explanatory variable Marginal t-statistic
eﬀect
Doctor-diagnosed health problems:
High blood pressure 1.66 (3.52)
Diabetes 5.66 (6.41)
Cancer 13.62 (8.61)
Lung disease 8.21 (6.17)
Heart problems 2.60 (4.18)
Stroke 5.57 (4.40)
(Age− 51)/10 3.26 (12.71)
× High blood pressure -0.44 (-2.31)
× Diabetes -0.72 (-3.07)
× Cancer -1.79 (-7.25)
× Lung disease -0.28 (-1.05)
× Heart problems 0.04 (0.18)
× Stroke -0.32 (-1.17)
Birth cohort:
1911–1915 -1.69 (-5.23)
1916–1920 -2.39 (-8.16)
1921–1925 -3.32 (-12.17)
1926–1930 -3.58 (-11.69)
1931–1935 -3.74 (-8.79)
1936–1940 -4.08 (-8.37)
1941–1945 -3.46 (-8.33)
1946–1950 -3.51 (-9.47)
1951–1955 -3.03 (-4.97)
Correctly predicted (%):
Both outcomes 92.87
Dead only 55.13
Alive only 93.01
Observations 43,452
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Table 3: Health Problems, Health Care Utilization, and Health Insurance Coverage
Panel A reports the percentage of individuals who have ever had doctor-diagnosed health problems or have
some diﬃculty with activities of daily living at the time of interview. Panel B reports the percentage of
individuals who have used health care in the two years prior to the interview. Panel C reports the percentage
of individuals who have health insurance at the time of interview. Panel D reports the percentage of
individuals who own life insurance or annuities including private pensions at the time of interview. It also
reports the median of total face value conditional on ownership, deﬂated by the consumer price index to 2005
dollars. Term-life insurance refers to individual and group policies that have only a death beneﬁt. Whole-life
insurance refers to policies that build cash value, from which the policyholder can borrow or receive cash
upon surrender of the policy. Supplementary health insurance includes Medigap insurance and refers to any
coverage that is not government, employer-provided, or long-term care insurance. The sample consists of
male respondents aged 51 and older in the Health and Retirement Study for the period 1992 to 2006.
Age 51–66 67–82 83–
Health Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good
Panel A: Health problems (%)
Doctor-diagnosed health problems:
High blood pressure 59 32 65 46 57 44
Diabetes 22 9 34 14 20 14
Cancer 9 4 30 12 28 20
Lung disease 10 4 21 7 20 7
Heart problems 28 11 56 26 77 31
Stroke 7 3 21 6 33 11
Some diﬃculty with
Bathing 5 1 10 4 27 15
Dressing 9 4 14 8 30 18
Eating 2 1 5 2 16 7
Panel B: Health care utilization (%)
Monthly doctor visits 11 4 17 8 21 12
Hospital stay 27 14 43 26 54 37
Outpatient surgery 21 17 26 21 24 21
Nursing home stay 1 0 4 2 19 8
Home health care 4 2 12 6 24 13
Special facilities and services 7 4 10 6 15 11
Prescription drugs 79 52 94 76 97 80
Panel C: Health insurance (%)
Medicare 22 17 98 97 99 98
Medicaid 3 2 3 5 5 7
Employer-provided health insurance 58 63 36 32 30 26
Supplementary health insurance 10 11 33 32 38 38
Long-term care insurance 7 7 12 13 10 9
Panel D: Life insurance, annuities including private pensions, and net worth (thousands of 2005 dollars)
Ownership rate (%):
All life insurance 78 80 71 71 59 57
Term-life insurance 62 65 50 51 38 38
Whole-life insurance 29 33 30 28 23 19
Annuities including private pensions 40 45 56 54 52 53
Annuities excluding private pensions 1 1 4 4 6 6
Median face value conditional on ownership:
All life insurance 57 72 18 20 10 10
Term-life insurance 50 67 12 14 7 7
Whole-life insurance 35 40 20 20 11 11
Net worth excluding life insurance and annuities 120 161 186 187 170 153
52
Table 4: Health Distribution, Life Expectancy, and Out-of-Pocket Health Expenses
Panel A reports the health distribution at each age for a population of individuals who are
in good health at age 51. Panel B reports the remaining life expectancy by age and health.
Panel C reports annual out-of-pocket health expenses by age and health in thousands of
2005 dollars. Panel D reports annual income by age in thousands of 2005 dollars. Panel E
reports the present value of future income in excess of out-of-pocket health expenses by age
and health in thousands of 2005 dollars. The reported estimates are for male respondents in
good health at age 51, born 1936 to 1940 in the Health and Retirement Study.
Health Age
51 59 67 75 83 91 99
Panel A: Health distribution (%)
Dead 0 15 30 45 62 83 97
Poor 0 22 18 16 14 9 2
Good 100 63 52 39 23 8 1
Panel B: Life expectancy (years)
Poor 24 20 15 11 8 5 4
Good 26 23 19 14 10 7 4
Mean 26 22 18 13 9 6 4
Panel C: Out-of-pocket health expenses
(thousands of 2005 dollars per year)
Poor 2 5 8 13 21 38 70
Good 0 1 3 5 7 11 14
Mean 0 2 4 7 13 25 54
Panel D: Income (thousands of 2005 dollars per year)
Mean 51 38 26 21 18 16 14
Panel E: Present value of future disposable income
(thousands of 2005 dollars)
Poor 428 232 107 18 -42 -78 -96
Good 467 270 135 31 -49 -106 -135
Mean 467 260 128 27 -46 -91 -107
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Table 5: Determinants of Health and Mortality Delta
The explanatory variables in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation include dummy variables for poor health and 65 or older, a quadratic
polynomial in age, the interaction of the dummy variables with age, and cohort dummies. The omitted cohort is those born
prior to 1911. Additional explanatory variables in the second speciﬁcation include dummy variables for marital status, living
children, education, and self-reported general health status. The omitted categories are no-high school education and good self-
reported health status. The table reports the regression coeﬃcients with heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses.
The sample consists of male respondents aged 51 and older in the Health and Retirement Study for the period 1992 to 2006.
Explanatory variable Health delta Mortality delta
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poor health 1.13 (3.13) 0.91 (2.49) -15.50 (-3.42) -1.98 (-0.44)
65 or older -10.46 (-4.34) -4.40 (-1.79) -150.00 (-11.28) -100.00 (-7.49)
Married -0.13 (-0.29) 42.60 (7.69)
Has living children 0.98 (1.69) 33.49 (4.27)
Education:
High school graduate -0.39 (-1.02) 21.09 (5.54)
College graduate 3.27 (5.68) 126.00 (20.08)
Self-reported health status:
Poor 1.16 (2.15) 39.46 (5.65)
Fair 0.13 (0.28) 19.60 (3.51)
Very good 0.02 (0.04) -15.05 (-2.51)
Excellent 1.90 (2.68) -11.77 (-1.73)
(Age− 51)/10 -1.79 (-1.28) 17.02 (8.59) -23.93 (-1.67) 151.59 (8.98)
× Poor health -2.68 (-3.79) -4.35 (-6.14) -1.69 (-0.31) -19.97 (-3.71)
× 65 or older -3.16 (-1.34) -11.34 (-4.64) 44.85 (2.64) -17.43 (-1.01)
× Married -2.82 (-3.77) -40.07 (-6.85)
× Has living children -5.02 (-4.57) -40.17 (-4.65)
× High school graduate -7.60 (-12.23) -49.33 (-11.62)
× College graduate -19.95 (-18.75) -170.00 (-22.17)
× Poor -3.20 (-2.78) -38.39 (-4.31)
× Fair -1.93 (-2.19) -21.64 (-3.25)
× Very good 3.73 (4.29) 28.94 (4.43)
× Excellent 4.73 (4.36) 39.30 (5.31)
(Age− 51)2/100 -6.44 (-5.71) -12.38 (-10.32) -38.65 (-4.00) -83.69 (-8.49)
× Poor health 0.61 (3.24) 1.14 (6.04) 1.53 (1.20) 5.81 (4.50)
× 65 or older 8.04 (6.82) 11.11 (9.32) 38.79 (3.97) 60.56 (6.22)
× Married 0.81 (4.24) 7.98 (6.05)
× Has living children 1.38 (4.88) 8.79 (4.48)
× High school graduate 1.93 (11.93) 11.45 (11.47)
× College graduate 4.39 (15.50) 33.97 (18.46)
× Poor 0.94 (3.02) 8.21 (3.73)
× Fair 0.63 (2.68) 4.89 (3.02)
× Very good -1.04 (-4.64) -7.01 (-4.64)
× Excellent -1.41 (-5.21) -9.95 (-5.89)
Birth cohort:
1911–1915 -0.70 (-1.27) -0.79 (-1.49) 0.25 (0.13) -0.96 (-0.49)
1916–1920 -4.67 (-7.23) -3.54 (-5.79) -10.97 (-4.63) -6.97 (-3.06)
1921–1925 -5.83 (-7.94) -3.58 (-5.14) -16.26 (-5.96) -7.23 (-2.76)
1926–1930 -9.07 (-10.53) -5.59 (-6.76) -25.71 (-7.61) -11.78 (-3.59)
1931–1935 -7.00 (-7.41) -3.63 (-4.00) -19.33 (-4.85) -4.81 (-1.24)
1936–1940 -6.56 (-6.55) -2.48 (-2.57) -6.43 (-1.43) 9.93 (2.26)
1941–1945 -6.51 (-6.36) -2.22 (-2.23) 15.17 (3.09) 30.23 (6.23)
1946–1950 -6.40 (-6.32) -2.12 (-2.16) 37.09 (6.28) 48.77 (8.40)
1951–1955 -6.79 (-6.60) -2.72 (-2.73) 27.15 (3.25) 43.84 (5.28)
R2 (%) 6.60 13.00 12.08 15.83
Observations 32,778 32,341 32,778 32,341
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Table 6: Preference Parameters
The subjective discount factor is reported in annualized units. The value for relative risk
aversion is based on a previous estimate in the Health and Retirement Study (Barsky et al.,
1997). The utility weights for death and poor health are estimated by continuous-updating
generalized method of moments with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. The sample consists of male respondents aged 51 and older in the Health and Retirement
Study for the period 1992 to 2006.
Parameter Symbol Value
Subjective discount factor β 0.96
Relative risk aversion γ 4
Utility weight for death ω(1) 5.00
(0.13)
Utility weight for poor health ω(2) 0.84
(0.02)
Utility weight for good health ω(3) 1.00
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Table 7: Welfare Cost of Household Insurance Choice
This table reports the median welfare cost by age group, expressed as a percentage of total
wealth. The welfare cost for each household is measured by the deviations of the observed
health and mortality delta from the optimal health and mortality delta. The lifetime cost
is based on the probability of future ownership of health and longevity products, implied by
the probit model in Table 8. The sample consists of male respondents aged 51 and older in
the Health and Retirement Study for the period 1992 to 2006.
Age
51–58 59–66 67–74 75–82 83–90 91–
Panel A: Per-period welfare cost (% of total wealth)
Total cost 0.87 0.56 0.53 0.64 0.81 0.94
(0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.26) (1.10)
Cost due to health delta 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.19 0.15
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (1.01)
Cost due to mortality delta 0.87 0.54 0.48 0.59 0.83 1.20
(0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.13) (0.35) (1.41)
Panel B: Lifetime welfare cost (% of total wealth)
Total cost 28.49 22.52 12.98 5.24 2.89 2.14
(0.51) (0.32) (0.29) (0.22) (0.38) (1.41)
Cost due to health delta 0.77 0.69 0.65 0.62 0.53 0.30
(0.18) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.18) (1.35)
Cost due to mortality delta 29.61 24.01 14.36 6.00 3.53 2.92
(0.50) (0.31) (0.27) (0.24) (0.48) (1.82)
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Table 8: Predicting the Future Ownership of Health and Longevity Products
This table reports an estimate of a probit model for predicting ownership of a given type of policy at two years from the
present interview. The explanatory variables include dummy variables for present policy owner, poor health, and 65 or older;
a quadratic polynomial in age; the interaction of the dummy variables with age; and cohort dummies. The omitted cohort is
those born prior to 1911. The table reports the marginal eﬀects on the probability of ownership (in percentage points) with
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses. The sample consists of male respondents aged 51 and older in the Health
and Retirement Study for the period 1992 to 2006.
Explanatory variable Term-life Whole-life Annuities including Supplementary Long-term
insurance insurance private pensions health insurance care insurance
Present owner 46.36 (24.39) 66.80 (38.66) 53.19 (43.64) 33.46 (15.28) 23.84 (9.13)
Poor health -2.39 (-1.05) -1.23 (-0.62) -5.78 (-3.55) 3.38 (2.67) -1.42 (-1.97)
65 or older -11.83 (-1.42) -26.47 (-3.44) 2.85 (0.40) 19.82 (4.98) 1.80 (0.58)
(Age− 51)/10 17.02 (2.43) -10.46 (-1.73) -23.87 (-5.05) -21.56 (-6.33) -1.57 (-0.75)
× Present owner 2.97 (1.03) -2.01 (-0.74) 10.83 (4.95) 6.38 (3.99) 9.90 (7.45)
× Poor health -0.04 (-0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 5.57 (2.36) -0.29 (-0.19) 0.82 (0.76)
× 65 or older -4.35 (-0.45) 29.90 (3.41) 13.96 (1.81) 3.84 (0.83) 1.28 (0.37)
(Age− 51)2/100 -12.95 (-2.77) 3.51 (0.85) 11.83 (3.81) 19.02 (8.60) 2.26 (1.61)
× Present owner -0.48 (-0.60) -0.16 (-0.21) -0.53 (-0.84) -1.17 (-2.86) -1.42 (-3.88)
× Poor health 0.25 (0.29) 0.27 (0.34) -1.21 (-1.70) 0.26 (0.62) 0.08 (0.25)
× 65 or older 11.03 (2.29) -9.00 (-2.09) -11.70 (-3.48) -14.81 (-6.43) -2.46 (-1.61)
Birth cohort:
1911–1915 8.00 (2.11) -9.47 (-3.55) 2.70 (0.87) 12.74 (5.09) 2.06 (0.92)
1916–1920 14.23 (3.86) -11.61 (-4.54) 0.90 (0.27) 13.97 (5.07) 1.79 (0.76)
1921–1925 17.76 (4.75) -13.74 (-5.32) -2.59 (-0.72) 15.12 (5.11) 4.92 (1.68)
1926–1930 20.17 (5.25) -16.40 (-6.53) -3.83 (-1.03) 18.48 (5.76) 5.72 (1.85)
1931–1935 25.27 (6.54) -18.78 (-6.93) -6.80 (-1.78) 16.72 (5.49) 5.91 (1.98)
1936–1940 28.79 (7.45) -22.52 (-8.44) -10.14 (-2.63) 14.18 (4.80) 6.47 (2.16)
1941–1945 31.50 (9.66) -20.74 (-9.92) -11.95 (-3.08) 9.26 (2.98) 9.16 (2.42)
1946–1950 35.92 (14.07) -22.17 (-14.75) -14.27 (-3.62) 6.48 (1.97) 10.81 (2.48)
1951–1955 36.75 (16.66) -21.57 (-17.05) -21.89 (-5.39) -0.89 (-0.27) 11.23 (2.29)
Correctly predicted (%):
Both outcomes 75.68 85.20 81.82 85.07 92.17
Owner only 77.24 74.62 81.84 60.66 64.51
Not owner only 73.56 89.52 81.79 89.84 94.37
Observations 18,353 18,651 39,457 38,031 38,080
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Table 9: Lifetime Welfare Cost under Alternative Assumptions
This table reports the median lifetime welfare cost by age group, expressed as a percentage
of total wealth. The table reports the welfare cost under alternative assumptions including
a bequest motive that is weaker or stronger than the estimated bequest motive and health
and longevity products that are more expensive than actuarially fair. The sample consists
of male respondents aged 51 and older in the Health and Retirement Study for the period
1992 to 2006.
Parameter Value Age
51–58 59–66 67–74 75–82 83–90 91–
Panel A: Per-period welfare cost (% of total wealth)
Utility weight for death 4.00 0.91 0.62 0.61 0.80 1.09 1.27
(0.10) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.22) (1.04)
6.00 0.89 0.56 0.50 0.61 0.64 0.67
(0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.28) (1.15)
Discount rate on life insurance 0% 0.84 0.54 0.52 0.63 0.80 0.94
(0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.26) (1.10)
Discount rate on annuities 0% 0.84 0.56 0.53 0.65 0.81 0.92
(0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.26) (1.10)
Discount rate on supplementary 0% 0.87 0.56 0.53 0.64 0.81 0.94
health insurance (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.26) (1.10)
Panel B: Lifetime welfare cost (% of total wealth)
Utility weight for death 4.00 36.97 29.91 17.26 7.29 4.33 3.02
(0.49) (0.35) (0.32) (0.21) (0.34) (1.30)
6.00 24.15 18.47 10.64 4.37 2.28 1.64
(0.52) (0.29) (0.27) (0.23) (0.42) (1.48)
Discount rate on life insurance 0% 28.26 22.34 12.91 5.22 2.88 2.14
(0.51) (0.32) (0.28) (0.22) (0.38) (1.41)
Discount rate on annuities 0% 27.84 22.08 12.64 5.16 2.90 2.22
(0.51) (0.31) (0.28) (0.21) (0.38) (1.40)
Discount rate on supplementary 0% 28.49 22.52 12.98 5.24 2.89 2.14
health insurance (0.51) (0.32) (0.29) (0.22) (0.38) (1.40)
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Table 10: An Optimal Portfolio of Health and Longevity Products
Panel A reports the optimal health and mortality delta by age, implied by a life-cycle model
with the preference parameters in Table 6. Panel B reports a portfolio of short-term life
insurance, deferred annuities, short-term health insurance, and bonds that replicates the
optimal health and mortality delta. Short-term policies have maturity of two years, and the
income payments from deferred annuities start at age 65. Panel C reports the cost of the
optimal portfolio in thousands of 2005 dollars, averaged across the health distribution at the
given age. The reported estimates are for male respondents in good health at age 51, born
1936 to 1940 in the Health and Retirement Study.
Age
51 59 67 75 83 91 99
Panel A: Optimal health and mortality delta (thousands of 2005 dollars)
Health delta 7 -3 -13 -20 -17 8 83
Mortality delta 188 15 -78 -132 -167 -188 -185
Panel B: Optimal portfolio (units)
Short-term life insurance 188 34 0 0 0 0 0
Deferred annuity 0 3 11 23 40 65 95
Short-term health insurance 1.80 0.00 0.07 0.53 0.77 0.82 0.85
Bond 60 204 228 219 210 201 193
Panel C: Cost of the optimal portfolio (thousands of 2005 dollars)
Short-term life insurance 5 1 0 0 0 0 0
Deferred annuity 0 17 68 110 125 115 83
Short-term health insurance 2 0 0 3 9 22 44
Bond 58 196 219 210 202 193 185
Total cost 65 215 287 323 335 330 312
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Figure 1: Ownership Rates of Health and Longevity Products
Term-life insurance refers to individual and group policies that have only a death beneﬁt. Whole-life insurance refers to policies
that build cash value, from which the policyholder can borrow or receive cash upon surrender of the policy. Supplementary
health insurance includes Medigap insurance and refers to any coverage that is not government, employer-provided, or long-term
care insurance. The sample consists of male respondents aged 51 and older in the Health and Retirement Study for the period
1992 to 2006.
60
Dead Poor Good
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Health
P
a
y
o
f
f
 
(
$
1
k
)
Short−term life insurance
 
 
Health delta
Mortality delta
Dead Poor Good
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Health
P
a
y
o
f
f
 
(
$
1
k
)
Short−term annuity
Dead Poor Good
0
1
2
3
4
5
Health
P
a
y
o
f
f
 
(
$
1
k
)
Short−term health insurance
Dead Poor Good
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Health
P
a
y
o
f
f
 
(
$
1
k
)
Long−term life insurance
Dead Poor Good
0
2
4
6
8
10
Health
P
a
y
o
f
f
 
(
$
1
k
)
Long−term annuity
Dead Poor Good
0
10
20
30
40
50
Health
P
a
y
o
f
f
 
(
$
1
k
)
Long−term health insurance
Figure 2: Health and Mortality Delta for Health and Longevity Products
This ﬁgure reports the health and mortality delta for life insurance, annuities, and health insurance. The solid line represents
the payoﬀ of each policy for the three possible health states in two years, reported in thousands of 2005 dollars. Health delta is
minus the slope of the dashed line, normalizing the horizontal distance between good and poor health as one. Mortality delta
is minus two times the slope of the dotted line, normalizing the horizontal distance between good health and death as two.
Short-term policies have maturity of two years, while long-term policies mature at death. The reported estimates are for male
respondents at age 51, born 1936 to 1940 in the Health and Retirement Study.
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Figure 3: Health and Mortality Delta for Health and Longevity Products over the Life Cycle
This ﬁgure reports the health and mortality delta per dollar investment for life insurance, annuities, and health insurance.
Short-term policies have maturity of two years, while long-term policies mature at death. The reported estimates are for male
respondents in good health at the given age, born 1936 to 1940 in the Health and Retirement Study.
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Figure 4: Health and Mortality Delta Implied by Household Insurance Choice
The left (right) panel reports the median and mean health (mortality) delta by age, smoothed around a plus and minus two-year
window. Each dot represents one of 32,778 household-interview observations in the Health and Retirement Study for the period
1992 to 2006.
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Figure 5: Welfare Cost of Household Insurance Choice
This ﬁgure reports the median welfare cost by age, smoothed around a plus and minus two-year window and expressed as
a percentage of total wealth. The welfare cost for each household is measured by the deviations of the observed health and
mortality delta from the optimal health and mortality delta. The lifetime cost is based on the probability of future ownership of
health and longevity products, implied by the probit model in Table 8. Each dot represents one of 32,778 household-interview
observations in the Health and Retirement Study for the period 1992 to 2006.
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Figure 6: Deviations of the Observed Health and Mortality Delta from the Optimal Health and Mortality Delta
The left (right) panel reports the percentage of households whose health (mortality) delta is higher than the optimal health
(mortality) delta, whose health (mortality) delta is lower than the optimal health (mortality) delta, and whose health (mortality)
delta is lower than that implied by a life-cycle model without a bequest motive. The optimal health and mortality delta are
based on the preference parameters in Table 6. The sample consists of male respondents aged 51 and older in the Health and
Retirement Study for the period 1992 to 2006.
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Figure 7: Optimal Health and Mortality Delta over the Life Cycle
The sum of health (mortality) delta for short-term life insurance, deferred annuities, and short-term health insurance equals the
optimal health (mortality) delta at each age. Short-term policies have maturity of two years, and the income payments from
deferred annuities start at age 65. The reported estimates are for male respondents in good health at age 51, born 1936 to 1940
in the Health and Retirement Study.
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